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by Joel B. Eisen 
y the 1980s, deteriorating hulks of abandoned factories and overgrown vacant lots in many American 
as notable symbols of urban decline. These sites had earned the label of"brownfields," which 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) now defines as "[a]bandoned, idled, or under-qsed in-
dustrial commercial facilities where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived 
environmental contamination."1 A brownfield site can be as small as a comer lot or as large as an aban-
doned mill, though former industrial properties attract the most attention. According to one estimate 
there were as many as 500,000 such sites in the United States. 2 The extent of contamination present at these 
sites after decades of industrial activity was unknown. In the meantime, businesses fled increasingly to 
suburban exurban locations known as "greenfields," motivated in part by the widespread perception of 
these locations as "clean." 
While the problem of urban blight and flight to suburban greenfields has many causes, it largely arose 
~because of the unintended chilling effect of the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-~pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),3 and its state-law analogues, on brownfields redevelopment.4 
Therefore, brownfields laws and policies typically aim directly at modifying those environmental laws 
thought to be most responsible for stifling urban development. The brownfields discussion is somewhat 
retrospective: it gives us an opportunity to learn from our mistakes and "avoid re-creating Brownfields and 
continuing legacy."5 If that were the only important aspect ofbrownfields revitalization, the link to 
sustainable development would probably not be readily apparent. However, each decision to remediate 
and reuse brownfields triggers a much wider variety of concerns: documenting and eliminating environ-
mental health risks while promoting reinvestment, creating jobs, slowing the acceleration of suburban 
"greenfields" development, decreasing polarization of communities, and fostering public involvement in 
every aspect of redevelopment efforts. Each brownfields site thus provides an excellent opportunity for us 
to discuss how to reverse decades of urban decay and to alleviate the unchecked, wasteful development in 
suburban America. 6 These are central concerns in sustainable development policy, and the link between 
brownfields policies and sustainable development is therefore quite tangible. Not surprisingly, 
brownfields developers are often quick to call their projects core elements ofurban sustainability efforts. 
The laws and policies designed to address brownfields revitalization are therefore an excellent vehicle 
for assessing progress in the United States toward many of Agenda 21's7 objectives, including those relat-
ing to land development. Foremost among these objectives are Article 7 (promoting sustainable human 
settlement development), Article 8 (integrating environment and development in decisionmaking, includ-
ing the role of citizen participation), and Articles 23-32 (relating to involvement of a range of citizens in 
government decisionmaking); the discussion in other chapters is also relevant. 8 In addition, Agenda 21 
calls for programs aimed at stemming or reversing suburban "sprawl,"9 and American states' 
sprawl-fighting "smart growth" strategies often target brownfields as part of a more comprehensive set of 
land use policies. 10 
. An interesting paradox is evident when one compares state and federal brownfields revitalization activi-
ties to the objectives described in Agenda 21. The brownfields programs have many desirable features, and 
are widely cited as an outstanding example of innovation in American environmental protection. How-
ever, substantial changes would be necessary to make them true benchmarks of sustainable development. 
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Certain!?; there is some recognition that brownfields revitalization should be carried out in a sustainable 
manner. 
1 The President's Council on Sustainable Development (PCSD) views brownfields as part of a 
U.S. sustainability strategy. Its flagship report calls upon the United States to: "Revitalize 
brownfields-which are contaminated, abandoned, or underused land-by making them more 
for redevelopment by providing regulatory flexibility, removing process barriers, and assessing greenfield 
development to reflect necessary infrastructure costs." 12 EPA's Sustainable Brownfields Model Frame-
work is more detailed, incorporating a comprehensive set of proposals designed to guide revitalization 
within a sustainable development perspective. 13 
Yet the states and federal government have a mixed record of following through on that 
brownfields revitalization could be done sustainably. The PCSD's recommendations are only advisory (as 
is the EPA's model framework), and despite some excellent efforts to bring federal expe1iise to bear on the 
brownfields problem, there still is nothing resembling a federal "sustainable brownfields" program. Nor 
will there ever be such a program, in part because the states view the brownfields problem as an unwanted 
outgrowth of a harsh federal mandate. As for the states, which have been innovators in the: field, there is 
sparse recognition of any nexus between their programs and sustainable development. 
Critiquing how brownfields programs expanded without much attention to developments in the 
tional environmental arena will illustrate some ways to alter them to comport with Agenda 21 and other pre-
requisites for sustainable development. Another interesting aspect of this analysis for the Rio+ 10 review is 
its timing. The state and federal programs have mushroomed since 1992; for example, while a small 
of states had "voluntary cleanup programs" 10 years ago, virtually every state has one now, and there is con-
siderable increasing experience with them. If adjustments to these programs should be developed to 
comport with the prescriptions of Agenda 21 this be an excellent time to consider making them. 
A caveat is in order at the outset: discussion offers only a briefintroduction to this rapidly expanding 
field. Much has been written about it, including two treatises and numerous law review articles, and more 
is forthcoming at a rapid pace. 14 For now, it is this Chapter's aim to describe some ways in which existing 
state and federal programs could be enhanced to achieve Agenda 21 's objectives. 
The genesis of the brownfields problem is complicated. These sites serve as a powerful reminder the 
systemic ~roblems of urban America, identifying a single reason for decay and disinvestment is im-
possible. 1 But one catalyst is often cited as virtually paramount: the chilling impact of environmental laws 
on urban redevelopment. Foremost among these laws is CERCLA, the nation's primary hazardous waste 
remediation law. CERCLA is a comprehensive remedial statute that gives the federal government exten-
sive powers to order government agencies and private parties to clean up dangerous hazardous waste sites. 
Cleanup efforts under CERCLA focus on the most dangerous hazardous waste sites in the nation, espe-
cially those sites listed on the national priorities list (NPL ). 16 EPA and the U.S. Department of Justice 
ate numerous lawsuits each year against site owners and other parties to force cleanups ofNPL sites or re-
cov~r funds used by the federal government from the "Superfund" to clean up sites. These lawsuits 
other actions initiated by administrative processes typically require private parties to incur substantial 
costs in remediating contaminated sites. CERCLA lawsuits are usually protracted, expensive proceedings 
that involve hundreds of parties. 17 
CERCLA's sweeping remedial nature18 is evident in the strictness of the statutory scheme, where 
ity is imposed broadly to force polluters to pay response costs related to hazardous waste sites. 
courts breathed life into the statute, defining statutory terms expansively to close loopholes in the 
scheme. 19 CERCLA liability is strict and no element of causation is required. 20 Under the statute, the cur-
rent "owner or operator" of a CERCLA site faces liability, so it is quite likely that the present owner a 
brownfield site could be held liable for cleanup costs even if that owner did not directly cause the contami 
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BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT 
nation (assuming it could not avail itself ofCERCLA's relatively 
held CERCLA liability is joint and several, the owner might face a 
defenses). 21 Because courts 
for of the site's costs 
simply virtue of owning the site. 22 
Even many brownfields sites have not been examined for contamination, history suggests 
that they are not usually among the most dangerous sites; however, if high levels of contamination are dis-
~~''""r''" a be added to NPL. 23 This uncertainty poses a grave threat to any would-be devel-
oper of a brownf1~lds site: t~e history of CERCLA is replet~ with complaints about ~emedial and 
transaction costs, excruciatmgly slow progress of cleanups, 5 and cleanup standards perceived by some 
as excessively conservative assumptions. Even if a brownfields site not on the NPL, 
could not confidently avoid environmental liability. Most states have environmental cleanup 
to CERCLA scope, and other state federal environmental laws could come into 
site depending on nature of past activities or contamination 
ofCERCLA liability and responsibility for cleanup costs presented serious problems forpro-
lh~n·"""'+' site developers. Uncertainty regarding potential environmental liability also contrib-
uted to a decline in the amount of investment capital available for sites. A line of cases 
imposed liability on lenders even though they or borrowers did not directly cause 
nation.26 Lenders responded by refusing to make loans on urban properties thought to 
those where any of industrial activity had taken place. 27 
Even they have limited ability to remedy the CERCLA problem, the states have taken the lead in 
creating laws policies designed to spur brownfields revitalization. The relatively slow pace offederal 
reforms, the widespread perception that state laws also needed overhauling, and even the states' antipathy 
to CERCLA as of an overall hostility to the federally centralized, enforcement-driven American envi-
regulatory regime have all spurred the rise of state programs. The primary impetus for 
redevelopment at the state level has come from programs known broadly as voluntary"'"''"""'!-' 
.... ~ ... ·""''" (VCPs). 
action on the brownfields front is multifaceted, and includes legislative efforts to reform 
'-''-"J'"-'-''-'I"!c directly and/or enact freestanding laws targeting brownfields, administrative 
by EPA other federal agencies, and targeted programs such as loan funds, grants, and tax incentives for 
brownfields projects. 
State 
every state has revamped its environmental cleanup laws (mostly in the 1990s) to establish some 
that targets brownfields.28 These programs are voluntary and usually begin when a pro-
spective approaches state regulators with a proposal for investigating and remediating a 
brownfield site through the state's program. This makes the brownfields setting markedly different from 
model of existing state and federal hazardous waste laws, where a party's 
regulators is typically a notice informing it that it faces under the statute. 
to proposing a project for a VCP, it is common for a developer to sound out state and local govern-
ment authorities about economic development incentives and take other steps to evaluate project merits. A 
savvy has therefore assessed whether it be beneficial to remediate the site before initiat-
ing contact with environmental regulators, even though there is usually no requirement of any sort that any 
"'"YAHUA unit approve of the developer's plans before it applies to take in a VCP. Because clean-
by developers, VCPs promote devolution of key decisions to private sector. can 
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tremendously advantageous if a brownfields project will improve the condition of a neglected site and re-
sult in overall benefits to the community, but this outcome is by no means guaranteed. 
VCPs often target urban sites but relatively few locations are ineligible. 29 In the spirit of encouraging 
private sector actors to initiate redevelopment activities, most VCPs allow anyone willing to remediate 
site-the site's owner, prospective purchaser, other interested party, or even, in some cases, the re-
sponsible for contaminating the site-to participate, though some restrict eligibility to prospective pur-
chasers or current property owners. Each VCP is unique, but the investigation, remediation, and liability 
protection process, generally speaking, is similar in each state, and confers three principal advantages on 
the participant: 
Streamlined Administrative Procedures 
The VCP process can be much quicker than a cleanup under CERCLA. Major decisions (does the need 
remediation? what remedy be used?) are made in months, not years. To conclude the process and 
come entitled to receive liability protection, many participants need only perform a relatively inexpensive 
preliminary investigation to determine the level of contamination. 30 If remediation is not necessary, the 
process ends. At more contaminated sites, the participant cleans up the site to state standards, but paper-
work and other administrative requirements are less burdensome than those of the normal remediation 
process. 
Relaxed Cleanup Standards 
The CERCLA cleanup standard and state standards that parallel it embody a preference for permanent site 
cleanup. The cleanup standard or the cost of meeting it cannot be determined in advance; a complicated 
risk assessment and management process must be performed anew at each site. By contrast, state VCPs 
employ modified standards based on standards allowing higher levels of risk. These standards are often 
less difficult and less costly to meet than those of CERCLA or its state counterparts, particularly if the par-
ticipant can use engineering controls (for example, encasing the contamination in concrete) or institutional 
controls (for example, creating deed restrictions limiting the use of the site). Many VCPs also provide a 
measure of predictability by allowing the participant to choose specific statewide "generic" cleanup stan-
dards set on a statewide basis that allow participants to remediate sites to pre-set levels based on the type of 
contamination found at the site and the specific environmental medium. 31 Referring to these 
one-size-fits-all standards, a participant can get a much clearer picture of cleanup requirements costs in 
advance. Even participants who choose to meet site-specific, risk-based standards are assured that compli-
ance costs will be lower. 
Liability Protection 
The participant may obtain relief from future state liability for past contamination upon completion of the 
cleanup (or preliminary investigation if a cleanup is unnecessary). The forms and scope ofliability protec-
tion vary widely from state to state. 32 Some state regulators issue "no further action" letters promising they 
will not pursue further enforcement action once cleanups are complete. 33 Other states offer more compre-
hensive liability protection, such as releases from liability under applicable state statutes, certificates of 
•. satisfactory completion, and covenants not to sue brownfields developers. 34 
Federal Brownfields 
As noted above, federal brownfields initiatives have taken a number of forms. On the legislative front, 
there have been several attempts to overhaul CERCLA since the 1986 Amendments, of have 
failed to pass muster in the U.S. Congress.35 Recognizing this logjam, Congress has passed and President 
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:BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT 
Bush has signed a new law at the brownfields problem. 36 The "Small Business Liability Relief 
Brownfields Revitalization Act" of 2002 combined two bills: one provided small businesses relief from li-
ability CERCLA (new Title I) one addressed brownfields issues (new Title II). The brownfields 
title establishes grant funds and programs to assist state VCPs, and perhaps most importantly from the per-
spective of the states developers, sets limits on federal enforcement under CERCLA for VCP partici- .· 
pants only to limited "reopeners" on EPA's part) and protects contiguous property owners, pro-• 
spective purchasers, and innocent landowners from CERCLA liability. 37 
has adopted policies intended to reduce the risk ofliability. The guidance on "prospective pur-
chaser agreements" focuses on liability concems38 intends to reduce the risk that a party will face 
after purchasing a brownfields site. EPA has also acted to extend the protection against 
afforded b~ the states at the con cl us ion of the V CP process. Amended S uperfund Memoranda 
(SMOA) 9 individual states commit EPA to refrain from pursuing enforcement action 
at sites in the state in question once those sites have been the subject of successful action in a VCP. Thus, the 
spectre offederal liability has all but vanished. The SMOAs and new brownfields law, coupled with the 
sense the EPA is unlikely to target its enforcement resources to sites which have 
been the of state scrutiny, have erased enough uncertainty to lead to a dramatic increase in the num-
ber of addressed in VCPs.40 
>«-""",...,."' EPA's administrative reforms, there have numerous other federal initiatives to spur 
brownfields revitalization. A tax deduction for qualified remediation expenses associated with 
brownfields, originally scheduled to end in years, was extended in 1999 and again in 2000. 41 Other 
federal agencies and departments have established pilot projects, provided financing (includ-
ing grants loan funds), and created other incentives for brownfields redevelopment. 42 These programs 
have had some success; for example, EPA's brownfields "pilot" projects designed to test cleanup policies 
(but stopping short of actual remediation activities) have led to productive redevelopment activities at ur-
ban sites.43 none has had the comprehensive impact on individual redevelopment projects of the 
VCPs, so the remainder of this section is directed primarily to an evaluation of those programs. 
revitalization is widely viewed as successful, given that thousands of sites have been 
state programs. To cite just one example, Pennsylvania boasts that it has remediated more 
than 500 sites in its Land Recycling Program.44 At these sites, new economic activity is often taking place 
where once there was a vacant lot or a factory shell. The reallocation of responsibilities for environmental 
that brownfields programs achieves is also noteworthy. In the states' leadership role 
revitalization fulfills Agenda 21 's requirement that national governments delegate institu-
tional responsibility for attaining sustainable development "to the lowest level of public authority consis-
effective action. "45 This does not necessarily mean, however, that the states are acting in a manner 
as to promote sustainable development. One potential danger is that sites viewed as successfully and 
completely remediated today tum out not to be so in future, through repollution of the site from a 
new use or discovery of existing contamination not remediated in the initial effort. While it is too early to 
predict that will be a major concern, the risk is sufficiently problematic to justify efforts by states 
to pay more attention to the matter. 
area that deserves increased focus is the minimal extent to which state programs require devel-
to communicate with the affected public throughout the revitalization process. In practice the failure 
fo mandate communication has not always resulted in bad outcomes, particularly where smart developers 
on own involved local communities as partners in the process. Yet if much of attaining 
urban sustainability consists of creating and nurturing decisionmaking partnerships among all affected en-
meaningful dialogue and community participation ought to be required from the outset and not just 
461 
STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 
undertaken when it is in the developer's self-interest to do so. Finally, it is a matter of some concern the 
state VCPs typically leave many basic decisions-such as the use to which a remediated site will 
hands of brownfields developers at individual sites. This does not necessarily ensure a 
suboptimal outcome, as there have been many success stories in the field. However, analyses of brownfield 
site remediation activities show that success is more likely if revitalization takes place with careful atten-
tion to the current and future needs of the cities in which sites are located, rather than proceeding in an ad 
hoc fashion. 
Reflecting these and other concerns, this Chapter proposes that states consider altering their programs in 
ways, so as to incorporate the basic sustainability building blocks of "procedural integration," 
intergenerational equity, public participation. It will be a challenge to the states to adopt these changes 
making programs more bureaucratic cumbersome (and thus resembling the exist-
ing enforcement-driven environmental programs), particularly if they revamp VCPs to include more in-
clusive public participation provisions. The challenge may not, however, be as great as some would claim. 
For example, the typical objection to comprehensive community involvement is that it is likely to slow or 
stop otherwise meritorious projects. However, one commentator, analyzing a study of sites addressed in 
several EPA pilot projects, notes that communities were successfully engaged without delays in project 
progress.46 respect to aspects ofbrownfields revitalization, the same spirit of innovation that 
spurred the creation ofbrownfields programs the first place can and should be deployed to offer develop-
ers a streamlined alternative to environmental enforcement programs and simultaneously ensure that 
Agenda 21 's requirements have been met. 
(VCP Program Procedures) 
A good starting point is to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the VCPs themselves, and in 
their streamlined procedures for getting sites remediated and reused. As noted earlier, an important 
of any land use system for sustainable development is "procedural integration": the design and implemen-
tation of procedures at all levels of government that require early, simultaneous, and coordinated consider-
ation of social, environmental, and economic goals.47 The applicable Agenda 21 requirement is found in 
Chapter 8, which calls for "the progressive integration of economic, social and environmental issues."48 
Regulators must ensure consideration of all environmental costs and benefits from a project's inf'P'ntirm 
using appropriate analytical tools. 49 
This requirement aims to avoid unwise and potentially irreparable decisions, and to circumvent poten-
tial conflicts among regulatory agencies (for example, a commerce promotion department authorizes a 
project that an environmental regulator finds destructive to the environment).50 EPA's 
Brownfields Model Framework provides an excellent example of how a brownfields project 
structured in an integrated manner. There are l 0 major steps in a project, from development of the 
through site evaluation, remediation, and final reuse. At every one of these steps, the framework envisions 
feedback designed to enable government officials to better evaluate the project and its progress. 51 
Yet this elaborate feedback mechanism does not resemble the reality of most brownfields projects. Inte-
grated procedures are typically not incorporated in most VCPs at two important steps: evaluation of a 
ject's merits and supervision of the cleanup process. The developer may need local approvals for incidental 
matters such as traffic plans, no comprehensive review of the project, at its outset, is required under the 
typical VCP statute or pursuant to most local land use ordinances (in the latter case, the inquiry')$ 
limited to whether the pro~osed use is consistent with its zoning-for example, an industrial use on the for-
mer location of a factory). 2 As for supervising the cleanup process, some VCPs allow the participant to op-
erate essentially independently with little or no state oversight-an increasing trend involves allowing the 
developer to use a state-licensed consultant to supervise the cleanup, so that state regulators are 
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BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT 
only in reviewing the process at its conclusion. Only a minority of states are actively involved in approving 
plans and in supervising cleanup.53 
typical justification for this hands-off approach is that VCPs represent a streamlined alternative to 
the enfor6ement-driven model of environmental protection. States believe that developers, not regulators, 
retain as much control as possible over brownfields projects and ought to be able to complete them 
promptly regulatory burdens. The blanket exemption contained the new federal brownfields 
law upon this notion, leaving federal regulators virtually powerless to become involved at sites 
they believe cleanups have not adequately protected human health and the environment. This is a 
goal of many project proponents, who argue brownfields sites are less contaminated and should not attract 
federal interference. In many cases, this assumption oflesser contamination has been borne out in practice, 
but it is just that: an assumption. If regulators are left without effective means of ensuring from the outset 
that projects do not have adverse environmental consequences, the procedures of the typical VCP can 
hardly be considered adequate for sustainable development. 
Equity 
commentators have identified intergenerational equity as a prerequisite for sustainable develop-
referring to the Rio Declaration54 and other instruments for sustainable development. 55 As numerous 
commentators have indicated, this is difficult to define (how exactly do we preserve the environment while 
.,,.,,,rn~._,,,.0 it for future generations?), at some level this concept requires attention to whether activi-
ties taken in the short term have adverse consequences for the ability of future generations to enjoy a 
environment. Unfortunately, a shortcoming of virtually every brownfields program is the relative 
lack of concern for the future. State and federal programs define success more in terms of the short-term ve-
locity of the effort-the number of brownfields sites saved and redeveloped. 
If success is measured in terms of putting sites back into commerce, there is no question that the states 
have positive records over the past decade. And if one views the brownfields problem as an outgrowth of 
laws that stifled promising land developments, revamping those laws appears preferable to inertia. How-
ever, there has been less attention to whether communities are actually revitalized in the short and long 
term whether repollution is a concern at brownfields sites. This is particularly problematic because 
VCPs often make assumptions about the intended use ofbrownfields sites; cleanup standards are often tai-
lored to specific industrial, residential, or commercial uses of the sites. If those uses change in the future, 
there are few mechanisms in place to guarantee the health oflocal residents, and those created in existing 
brownfields laws have serious shortcomings. A common tactic is reliance on a state's law of property to 
protect the site's use for a specific purpose; this could leave some future owners free to disregard the re-
strictions. 56 It is imperative, given potential for harm to urban residents, that the states begin to 
design procedures to safeguard against repollution. 
Sustainable development strategies require concerted action by all levels of national government and all 
affected actors. A crucial part of any strategy is involvement by affected communities in land use deci-
sions, with appropriate outreach activities to facilitate involvement where necessary. This is deemed so im-
portant that it is reiterated throughout Agenda 21. Chapter 7 calls upon individual cities to "institutionalize 
a participatory approach to sustainable urban development, based on a continuous dialogue between the 
actors involved in urban development (the public sector, private sector and communities), especially 
women and indigenous people. "5 Chapter 8, referred to earlier in the context of developing integrated pro-
cedures for review of critical decisions, proposes that countries should "develop or improve mechanisms 
to facilitate the involvement of concerned individuals, groups and organizations in decision-making at all 
levels," with one activity in furtherance of this objective being,"[ e ]nsuring access by the public to relevant 
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infom1ation, facilitating the reception of public views and allowing for effective participation."58 Chapters 
23-32 of Agenda 21 expand upon this objective, calling for direct participation in decisionmaking activi-
ties by groups including women, youth, indigenous people and their communities, nongovernmental orga-
nizations, local authorities, workers and unions, business and industry, the scientific and technological 
community, and farmers. 59 Chapter 36 addresses education for sustainable development, calling for more 
activities to enhance public awareness of the complexity of environmental problems.60 
Most of these requirements are centered on a familiar theme: citizens must be involved in major 
mental decisions and receive timely and coherent information to enable them to take part in relevant deci-
sions. 61 To accomplish this in the brownfields revitalization context, an effective public participation sys-
tem would provide for input by the affected community throughout the process, from project selection to 
remediation and completion of the project. 62 The factors justifying more extensive participation-which 
may in some cases exceed in scope what would be the case in typical construction projects (particularly if 
no rezoning is required)-are numerous, and only some of the major ones are summarized here. 
brownfields sites are located in neighborhoods with higher than average concentrations of persons of color 
and other minorities. At the same time, many VCPs, as noted above, lower the applicable cleanup stan-
dards for brownfields sites. This combination has spurred some community groups to object to projects on 
"environmental justice" grounds: the argument is that it is inequitable to require these neighborhoods to ac-
cept a lower level of cleanliness than is required of sites elsewhere. For this and other reasons, EPA's Sus-
tainable Brownfields Model Framework states that a sustainable brownfields project "[a]ssures public in-
volvement throughout the process to foster equity among all community groups."63 
Another important reason for public participation in the brownfields revitalization process is that one 
simply cannot look at a site in isolation; instead, projects should be viewed as components of an ongoing 
effort to revitalize a city. Therefore, EPA's model process begins with project selection as part of a "con-
scious, intended collaboration between private sector organizations, public agencies and the community as 
a whole."64 In this partnership process, stakeholders plan together for a community's future, with individ-
ual brownfields projects emerging as part of that plan. Residents would also have a say in important deci-
sions relating to individual projects. 
Finally, contrary to conventional wisdom, public participation in brownfields revit.alization activities 
can also be beneficial for developers. Surveys of brownfields project participants and regulators have 
found that developers who involve local communities have a considerable advantage over those who do 
not. According to the limited but growing data, there are two major features that correlate strongly with the 
likelihood of a brownfields project being viewed as a success by both the developer and the community: 
involving the local community in redevelopment decisions and (2) planning that is not ad hoc 
consistent with an overall urban vision of growth.65 
At state level, however, there is typically no requirement to involve the community. Project selection 
is not required to be the result of a collaboration between the developer and the community; once a devel-
oper approaches the state to begin participation in its VCP, the project may often be a "done deal." Formal 
opportunities for input in other decisions relating to the project tend to be limited. The public participation 
processes oflocal land use ordinances (which are hardly ideal) do not come into play at all if no rezoning is 
required. Once a developer has entered into a VCP, the affected public may be somewhat involved in the 
cleanup process, usually during a brief notice-and-comment period required by the VCP law. 66 These re-
.. q uirements, however, suffer from the shortcomings of the typical "notice-and-comment" public input pro-
cess employed for administrative rulemaking. For example, while regulators are occasionally!fequired to 
consider citizen input, there is often no requirement to incorporate public suggestions by requiring 
retailoring of the project. Beyond the notice-and-comment rulemaking, there are few requirements to 
public meetings or employ other devices for educating the public. 
In practice, many developers have gone beyond the bare bones requirements of state laws regarding 
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BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT 
public participation. With over a decade of experience, pragmatic developers have learned that involving 
communities as partners from the outset can make for successful brownfields projects. Developers often 
get the public on board through the formation of ad hoc "advisory committees" or similar entities to serve 
as soundi~ boards.67 Some of these developer-community partnerships have led to outstanding revitaliza-
tion efforts that participants view as models for other cities to emulate68; as noted above, data accumu-
lated to date indicates that both developers and local residents tend to view these as the most successful 
brownfields projects. Of course, there is usually no legal requirement to proceed in this fashion, and af-
fected communities are left to rely on developers' business decisions as to whether or not to partner with 
them in making important determinations. EPA has made clear that relying on market forces alone to gen-
erate development that is both desirable to the developer and beneficial to the community is wholly inap-
propriate from a sustainable development perspective.69 
A decade of experience with state and federal brownfields programs has yielded broadly perceived suc-
cesses. Redevelopment activities are taking place where previously there was no hope for the future of 
abandoned or underused sites. However, it is difficult to conclude that this alone means that brownfields re-
vitalization is being done sustainably. Fortunately, the elements are already in place for a transformation of 
existing programs to comport with Agenda 21 's objectives. There is increasing recognition that projects 
are more likely to succeed if done as part of an overall urban redevelopment strategy and not left to the con-
trol of market forces. There is no shortage of soup-to-nuts compendiums of "best practices" to guide sus-
tainable brownfields revitalization within this broader context. Some proposals, such as those embodied 
EPA's Sustainable Brownfields Model Framework, would improve existing programs. None, however, are 
enshrined in state or federal law, and that leaves many opportunities for brownfields programs to become 
outstanding examples of sustainable development strategies. 
A good starting point would be for the states to revamp their land use laws-including brownfields pro-
grams--to specifically require state and local policies designed to achieve sustainable development. In 
Australia, for example, a state statute directs regulators "to protect, restore and enhance the quality of the 
environment ... , having regard to the need to maintain ecologically sustainable development. "70 This term 
is defined comprehensively to include both concepts familiar in American law (for example, the "pol-
luter-pays" principle), and others viewed as important but not yet enshrined anywhere in American law 
(for example, pricing based on life-cycle analysis and achieving intergenerational equity). 71 
Beyond this basic mandate, a number of specific changes to state programs could be made. States should 
modify their VCPs to require integrated procedures; in particular, those states that allow developers to op-
erate on their own should provide for state oversight throughout the process. If they were recalcitrant to do 
this, Congress could amend CERCLA and provide EPA authority to approve or disprove of states' pro-
grams; the latter would receive no CERCLA liability protection for sites addressed in their programs.72 
While the trend is away from federal supervision and toward legislation reducing the spectre of federal in-
terference in brownfields policy, EPA has partly dispelled the states' fears by acting as a partner with them 
in brownfields revitalization. Thus, it is more difficult for the states to argue against limited federal in-: 
volvement in regulatory matters, particularly given that they would receive financial assistance and other 
benefits if pending legislation became law. 
The states should also act to bolster the public participation provisions of VCPs. Then-and only 
then-could it be said that Agenda 21 's requirements for full and active citizen participation throughout 
the revitalization process have been met. Finally, the states should work to prevent repollution of 
brownfields sites by modifying their programs to add provisions designed to guarantee long-term protec-
tion of sites where remediation has taken place.73 
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